The paper for my Master’s is an analysis of judicial elections at state high courts and the influence it has on the relationship (operationalized with legislative overrides) between the court and the other two branches. Below is the abstract, paper, and original presentation at the GSA conference.
Does the way in which state high court justices are selected influence their relationship with the executive and legislature? More precisely, do elections influence the chance that their decisions will be overridden by the legislature and governor? How does ideology influence the likelihood of overrides? These question tap into bigger questions of judicial decision-making, legitimacy, and judicial independence. Because of the role elections play in state high courts I argue that elected courts are more likely to be overridden by state legislatures. Ideological distance is not significant in the likelihood of overrides. This project uses unique data collected in conjunction with data from the State Supreme Court Data Project. This paper adds to the literature of the relationship between state high courts by examining overrides at the state level and by adding the influence of elections. – abstract