Methodological approach
The concept of the ideal type appears as an important methodological contribution in Weberian elaboration, even when it is criticized due to its apparent ambiguity. The ideal type is a methodological resource established by Weber in order to face the conceptual weakness of the social sciences. It is no mystery to anyone that one of the factors that distance them from the development of natural sciences is the lack of equivocality between their terms and concepts. Max Weber considers that the terms of common, non-formalized language have acquired different meanings throughout history. It is proper that cultures change, and with them, their language. It can be inferior, that the formation of clearly described ideal types constitute the previous and essential step for any investigation (Sharansky, 1969). Failure to do so represents the risk of leaving ambiguous areas, which can be subject to different interpretations.
Max Weber shows how in the generation and consolidation of a phenomenon as transcendental as capitalism, purely economic, the fundamental cause is not found in the root of the production relations of a given society but in a phenomenon of a political-theological nature such as It is the Reformation initiated by Luther within the Catholic Church. Weber points out that many kinds of classes between debtors and creditors or between property owners and dispossessed have been verified in all historical epochs. There have always been businesses and individuals who earn more than others do; Man has always had ambitions and aspirations for wealth. This form of capitalism arises, develops, and will be reflected in certain forms of exchange and production, will generate the industrial revolution, and will reach the most sophisticated economic and government systems. Social problems are expressed in particular situations: they are specific, and what matters is to be able to know them in their real significance. There are no laws of the particular. The criteria are the opposite: the more general the laws are in the natural sciences, the more valuable they are considered; on the other hand, for the social sciences, they are less useful. In other words, the knowledge of laws is a means for social research, but not its end. Interests lead to action, whether material or ideal (Weber, 2001). Human action is driven by the dynamics of interests, but it is not surprising that these creations of the ideas that are the images of the world determine the rails through which human action will pass, an aspect that is not at all trivial to understand explaining, or explaining understanding, the action in its course and results.
Everyone:
Two very important points that I want to highlight in this post – the discussion of Weber’s use of the ‘ideal type’, and the contrast between Weber’s understanding of how capitalism emerged and a Marxist and very structuralist explanation.
This is a good frame for thinking about the key differences in culturalist and structuralist explanations, as elaborated by Lichbach. Test your understanding of Weber, Marx, and Lichbach’s arguments by seeing if you can do your own ‘compare and contrast’ exercise.
I think differences can be established with the main points of Weber’s thought, which addresses the need to achieve a greater rapprochement between the abstract understandings of the economic view on the role of the economy in society, and the vision of sociologists and anthropologists closer to understanding the complex functioning exercised by social agents in the face of economic dynamics. From the position of Marx, Lichbach, values the incorporation of political elements to the analysis of the social class, without thereby abandoning the economic determination linked to the position before the means of production. While from Weber’s position he recognizes the importance of micro-sociological analysis that focuses on factors such as income and the provision of goods.