Herbst uses a comparative method to study the development of African states that focuses on militarization and border protection- or rather, the lack thereof- when juxtaposed to European states. It is important to note that Herbst continuously argues that war played an important, perhaps central, role in the consolidation of European states (Herbst, 1990.) Africa, on the other, did not use war as a primary gateway to state consolidation. Interestingly, where there is a focus on peace-building efforts in a postcolonial understanding of African states, Herbst contends that the very lack of major warfare outside of internal civil war has caused a significant dip in state border strengthening. In other works, Herbst has noted Charles Tilly’s quote: “War made the state, and the state made war” (Herbst, 1990).
This is certainly a unique perspective that has its strengths as well as its weaknesses. Comparative methods are as strong as the “norm” or base from which they are comparing. Though there are definitive differences in the usage of war for European states, there is also a primary and crucial difference in historical development that includes violent colonizations. African states did choose to keep the partitions drawn by European colonizers, there is understandable hesitance to engage in warfare after rebuilding from the challenges of colonialism. As mentioned in the Empirical Claims wiki, Herbst notes that wars were and are expensive endeavors. Countries gutted with the loss of natural resources, economic instability, and social instability focused internally rather than externally.
While this caused a noticeable lack of state consolidation, it was perhaps a necessary state of development for countries disenfranchised through the institution of colonialism. Herbst makes an interesting argument in the sense that he highlights the use of warfare in Europe to create funds, consolidate borders, control populations, and increase capital for several states. Additionally, Herbst argues that this constant threat of external aggression virtually forced states to consolidate their borders in a heavily anarchic world. However, even though this may have been the model for European states, African states dealing with the wreckage of colonialism did not have the same historical or material bases from which to pull in order to profit from the state-building benefits of war.
War was essential to the formation of borders and states in Europe and this is a key element that is missing from Africa. Africa was not suited for warfare with a sparse population that is focused on subsistence farming leaving them vulnerable to colonization which left Africa with little natural resources and the states weak. Today African countries still aren’t known for having a strong military presence. Factors such as a lack of resources and a weak government are preventing African nations from growing their military and economies. When the government lacks sufficient protection it opens the door for outside actors to come to power with violence. What ways can African countries grow their military so they can protect their people?
Ashley is posing some interesting questions. I think Herbst would argue that it is states themselves that need to be strengthened- in the sense of being able to exercise their authority throughout their territory. In classic literature on early modern statebuilding in Europe, wars forced the state to strengthen their militaries, but also to develop mechanisms with which to extract tax revenues from their citizens (specifically from those who had significant capital, like merchants) who in turn required concessions from teh state. This forged a strong connection between state and citizen over time, and created a sense that the state ‘belongs’ to citizens. I think Herbst is arguing that African countries, in the absence of security threats from neighboring states (because by 1950s, UN and international norms, and reciprocal vulnerability between weak states in Africa dampened inter-state warfare), states struggled to develop mechanisms that would strengthen state capacity and tie the state to its citizens.
What do you think about usage of comparative method to present his thesis in his book? I have little disagreement with Herbst for using this method because while reading this book, it still feels like, Africa is being discussed in the shadow of European State development. Secondly, comparative method has another disadvantage because it looks at only those factors of state development in Africa that were witnessed by Europe. A culturalist would disagree with Herbst on the basis that he has ignored all cultural elements that might have influenced state development in Africa. In the post-colonial future, Africa had to borrow institutes from its colonial masters just like all colonized regions without looking at the cultural compatibility with these foreign institutions. What is your point of view about use of comparative method and whether it limits Herbst options to look at state development in Africa?
What do you understand by ‘comparative method’? I’m not sure I’d agree with you when you say that “comparative method…looks only at those factors of state development in Africa that were witnessed by Europe.” The comparative method is about identifying similarities and differences and interpreting meaning from a systematic comparison. It need not imply that one thing is the standard that all must live up to. However, it is definitely true that Europe is treated as some sort of standard or mold that economic or political change will mirror in every other region. But that’s not the fault of the comparative method per se. Comparative method doesn’t limit Herbst in my view, it makes it possible for him to write the book — I actually think he is arguing that if one uses the comparative method properly, you can develop a theory that is not simply specific to Europe or any other context, but that relies on concepts that are portable across different contexts.