Acemoglu and Robinson’s methodology in their book, “Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy” (2006), draws on numerous case studies, cross-sectional evidence, and historical narratives of democratic experiences, transitions, and authoritarian regimes, using formal models to formulate an integrated framework of analysis to study democratization and its consolidation. As their case studies, the authors analyze four regime transitions; namely, England (from oligarchy to stable democracy); Argentina (swerving between various unstable equilibria); Singapore (from oligarchy to stable oligarchy, but with significant economic growth); and South Africa (from colonial kleptocracy to apartheid to possibly stable democracy).
To formulate their model, the authors conduct a comparison of the various factors that help or hinder democratization in their case studies, including the type of politics that shapes political institutions, the balance of power between the various socio-economic classes, the presence of de facto power to force institutional change, economic development, and so on. Through such measurement, the authors frame certain models. Firstly, they pose that elites have historically created democracies when they could not diffuse the threat of social unrest and violence by alternative means. Under the unique circumstance where the citizens’ state is poor, but social conditions, civic connections, and necessary infrastructure for organizing a revolution are conducive, the revolution becomes imminent. Secondly, democracies will not be an answer to the threat of revolution, even credibly imminent revolution, when inequality is high, and/or when the assets of elites are easily nationalized or taxed away, or when elites expect to lose control of the ability to write down basic constitutional rules that constrain the scope of democratic government action.
Acemoglu and Robinson’s methodology is really great in terms of being clear and simplistic. I really appreciate the way they clearly lay out their theoretical view of this idea in the literature that there is in fact motivating reasons for leaders to block innovation and change, and that they take on Geddes advice for hypothesis generation, and then testing. They show that sometimes, the answer is what we think intuitively is true, and sometimes it is a little more complicated. I think their methods are clear, but when applying the critique that Geddes has regarding research in political science, they lay out their argument, but generate simple hypotheses from the empirical findings rather than generating hypotheses and then testing their hypotheses..