Svolik breaks down the concepts of the problem of authoritarian control and the problem of authoritarian power sharing into four chapters. This wiki will address the main empirical findings in chapters 2-6.

• In Chapter 2, Svolik notes the immense heterogeneity amongst dictatorships. Through his dataset, Svolik generally finds that dictatorships grew during the period of 1946 to 1970s. However, the number of dictatorships began to dwindle afterwards. When these dictatorships began, most arose from newly independent countries and following a democratic breakdown. This section also includes findings that most dictatorships (69%) were governed by a civilian, not the military or indirect military rule. This section is important to establish general understanding of dictatorships.
• In Chapter 3, Svolik finds that the longer a dictator remains in office, the more likely he is to become an established authoritarian and is less likely to be removed from power by their inner circle of politicians Thus, these established authoritarians are more likely to die of natural causes or popular uprising, as opposed to coups. This empirical claim links back to the overall theme of the chapter that some dictators usurp power and become an established dictator (as opposed to contested). Svolik concludes that allies of the dictator often attempt to prevent these power grabs but often fail. These empirical findings support the notion that the longer an authoritarian remains in office, the less likely their allies can stage a coup.
• In Chapter 4, Svolik theorizes that legislative bodies and parties contribute to dictatorship stability by lessening commitment problems and monitoring other potential issues. Svolik’s empirical analysis of dictatorships finds that this theory to be true, as dictatorships with legislatures survive longer than those without at the 95% confidence level. Another empirical finding shows that dictatorships with legislatures experience fewer coups, transitions to democracy, and popular uprisings. This means that one factor driving the survival of a dictator is the institutionalization of a party or legislature, as these add durability to these regimes.
• In Chapter 5, Svolik tests his theory on military interventions and inequality, and finds that the frequency of military interventions increases and then decreases with inequality. This contributes to his theory that military interventions will only occur during a “brinksmanship regime”, or the middle between full dictatorship control and full military control (Svolik, 2012, p. 126).
• In Chapter 6, Svolik’s empirical analysis shows that dictatorships with one regime-sanctioned party are 2-3 times likelier to survive than regimes with multiple or no political party. Similarly, larger legislative seat share positively contributes to the survival of ruling coalitions. These empirical findings show the importance of a strong party, whether it be one party or a very strong party in a multi-party country. These findings contribute to Svolik’s theory that dictator co-optation is an important and driving factor of authoritarian politics.