Using historical narratives and cross-country evidence, Acemoglu and Robinson’s “Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy” (2006) provides an excellent model for explaining the factors that lead certain countries’ political paths towards democratization while preventing others. By differentiating between the rich minority that monopolizes political institutions and the majority of the poor citizens who are ruled, the authors argue that social choices are inherently conflictual due to the differences in the interests of the two social groups. Citizens, who are poor and more in number, prefer democracy due to its promise of equal allocation of political power and resources, whereas the elites seek to uphold a non-democratic political regime like dictatorship which can ensure their interests. The instances when non-democratic regimes can lean towards holding prospects of democratization is when citizens threaten to revolt and cause social disorder – in other words, the de facto power reaches a level that threatens the de jure power of the elites. In the event of extreme mutiny, if the elites’ attempts to suppress the citizens hold high costs while their offers of concessions to the citizens’ policy demands are also unsuccessful, the elites then resort to giving away political power and, thus, give in to democratization to avert a revolution.
In summary, the citizens want democracy and the elites want nondemocracy, and the balance of political power between the two groups determines whether the society transits from non-democracy to democracy as well as even also whether democracy, once formed, becomes consolidated or reverts back to nondemocracy again.
For consolidation of democracy to be certain, the elites have to completely give up on any incentive to overthrow democracy. The various elements that can contribute to strengthening the roots of democracy, according to the authors, include policies shaped by majority voting, an improved economic system based on equality, strong political institutions upholding the interests of the citizens, an effective role of the civil society, the nature of political and economic issues the country is facing, how these are being tackled as well as the role of globalization.
Sitwat,
I do not necessarily disagree with everything you claim, Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) do use their quantitative methods and find evidence that support their argument that political elites will try to hold power back and in a very small number of hands, even at the cost of growth and innovation. But it also is important to note the entire universe of the things they find once actually looking through the cases they select. Internal threats are not the only ones that Acemoglu and Robinson find lead to a sharing of power and an embracing of innovation and social change, they also find support for external threats leading to a change in the way that elites handle power and innovation. External threats reduce the incentive to block innovation. Political elites are more likely to embrace change because external threats mean that they need to keep up with everyone else around them.
I think that the evidences that Acemoglu and Robinson find that both support their theory and do not support their theory pose a very interesting situation for political elites in all regimes that often times is overlooked. It is not as black and white as Acemoglu and Robinson pose in their theory. As Authoritarian regimes try to hold onto power, they have to consider both inside their boarders and outside their boarders. The internal and external threats have to meet a balance when it comes to the ways in which political elites innovate both technologies and institutions.